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AN INFORlJIATION EXPLANATION OF TIlE SURVIVAL OF
 
TECllNICAL ANALYSIS IN CAPITAL MARKET
 
Abstract 
In an efficient market, technical analysis cannot earn abnormal returns. 
Technical strategies are inferior to a buy and hold strategy since they 
typically churn investor accounts. Nonetheless, technical analysis appears to 
thrive. The purpose of this paper is to explain why technical analysis survives 
even though it is inferior to a buy-and-hold strategy. A model is developed
that compares four investor groups -- informed insiders, buy-and-hold investors, 
technical traders, and uninformed naive fundamental traders -- and are compared
in the model. Surprisin~ly, it demonstrates the superiority of technical 
analysis relative to fundamental analysis. The equilibrium requires that 
different classes of investors earn different rates of return. Informed traders 
can only earn sufficient returns to cover their costs if there exist traders 
\.;ho, in some sense, are tradin~ on bad information or "noise" in the Fisher 
Black sense. The ultimate explanation for the survival of naive investment 
strategies is that informed traders must have someone with whom to trade. If 
all uninformed traders are driven out of the market there is no benefit to being 
informed. 
I. Introduction 
Technical analysis is a dominated strategy compared to a buy-and-hold 
strategy. According to efficient market hypothesis, technical analysis makes 
money only for brokers or newsletter publishers. Empirical evidence supports 
the vie,~ that investors can not earn abnormal profits using securities price and 
volume information. Nonetheless, technical analysis survives. 
The objective of this paper is to explain lihy technical analysis survives, 
even though it is inferior to a buy-and-hold strategy. This paper is concerned 
with naive technical analyses such as the Dow theory, bar charts and point and 
figure charts. 
There are few sophisticated technical rules that may explain why technical 
analysis I.orks. For example, Treynor and Ferguson (JF, 2985) demonstrate the 
usefulness of past price information in making an abnormal profit. They develop 
a Bayesian probability estimate using past price data to assess whether the 
market incorporates some firm-specific information, that is made available to 
investors. If the market does not have such information, and this is confirmed 
I~ith past price data, the investor with this private information can make a 
trading profit. Technical analysis in the Treynor-Ferguson sense is beyond the 
scope of this paper, however. This paper only explains the apparent paradox, 
that is, technical analysis does not work in an efficient capital market, yet it 
survives. 
II. Alternative Explanations 
(a) The technical traders earn a risk-adjusted rate of return for accounts, 
but they could expect to earn the same return selecting securities randomly. 
Technical analysis is not Iwrthlihile to perform in an efficient capital market; 
technical analysis lVill lose money over time by churning accounts. One possible 
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explanation why technical analysis survives IS that losers quit, but they are 
replaced by other naive investors. The ne\; naive investors entering the market, 
who play this technical analysis game, do not know anything about the naive 
investors exiting the market. It is sufficient for technical analysis to 
survive if the number of new naive investors equals the number of losers who 
exit the market. 
(b) Technical analysis may be superior to naive fundamental analysis if 
naive investors buy and sell securities on the basis of published public 
information (for example, accounting reports, earnings multipliers, etc.). 
These naive investors are likely to lose against well-informed insiders (and 
other experts) who obtain information more quickly or interpret such information 
more rapidly. The naive investors will be the last to buy when informed 
investors are selling and to sell when informed investors are buying. In this 
scenario, a wealth transfer from naive investors to informed investors occurs. 
Informed investors cannot profit from investors who employ a buy-and-hold 
strategy. They can only profit over naive investors who trade on inferior 
information. 
(c) Trading based on technical analysis is the same as trading based on a 
random strategy. Security prices change randomly. Any trading rule based on 
random changes is random, unless many technical traders follow the same rule. 
Technical traders follow numerous techniques. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that buy and sell orders occur randomly and approximate white noises. 
Random trading averages out the time one buys with the informed insiders \;ith 
the time one sells when the informed traders buy. Naive fundamental traders 
consistently lose money because they tend to buy and sell at the wrong time. A 
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random strategy based on technical analysis is, therefore, superior to a naive 
fundamental analysis. 
The rates of returns earned by different investor groups can be ranked as: 
(1) Informed insiders; (2) Buy-and-hold investors; (3) Technical traders; (4) 
Naive fundamental investors. Buy-and-hold investors earn a risk-adjusted rate 
of return warranted by an efficient capital market. The informed investors earn 
a rate of return above risk-adjusted rate of return while the naive fundamental 
investors earn a rate of return below risk-adjusted rate of return. Since the 
uninformed naive investors are consistently wrong, they earn a lower rate of 
return than that of technical traders who trade randomly. For an example, 
assume that the risk-adjusted rate of return is 87. if everyone is an informed 
insider. The informed insider is able to earn a 107. risk-adjusted rate of 
return if the uninformed naive investor trades at the wrong time. The 
difference, 2%, is a pure I'ealth transfer from uninformed naive investors to 
informed insiders ..The informed insiders can gain a higher return only at the 
expense of uninformed investors; they cannot gain from buy-and-hold investors. 
(d) Technical analysis provides liquidity service to the stock market. 
Otherwise, all trading activities would be among informed traders. Informed 
traders would eaarn only a risk-adjusted rate of return which would not be 
sufficient to pay the informed traders to collect information. In this 
scenario, the informed traders would stop trading and the stock market would 
lose liquidity. Technical analysts induce naive investors to enter the stock 
market. The informed traders then trade with poorly informed naive fundamental 
traders. 
In addition, technical analysis provides service to traders engaged in 
t~ansactions or portfolio revision. 1 portfolio revision trade occurs when an 
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investor sells securities to raise cash for a loan payment due immediately, for 
example, or a sudden death requires a portfolio rebalancing between cash and 
securities. This kind of trade is strictly transaction-specific. Technical 
traders do not trade on information at all. However, this kind of 
transaction-specific trade may not provide enough liquidity to the stock market 
and may not make information gathering a worthwhile activity. The naive 
fundamentalists add to stock market liquidity. Technical analysis is 
essentially a random strategy that provides a liquidity service to the stock 
market while earning a normal rate of return for such service. 
III.	 Model 
A.	 Assumptions 
(1)	 Investors are risk-neutral expected end-of-period wealth maximizers. 
(2)	 Investors have limited wealth, and they cannot borrow. 
(3)	 Risk-free security is used as a numeraire. 
(4)	 One period. model is considered. 
The	 sequence of events in the model can be represented by the following diagram: 
Po PT Pi 
, , ,	 I
,-------------- ,--------------- ,--------------- ,----­
to t I	 t T t 1 
Endowment Information Trading Payoff 
Let a trader start with N risky stocks whose price is denoted by a risk-free 
numeraire good F. The trader receives information at current time and either 
makes a trade or does not make a trade. The expected payoff occurs at the end 
of the current period. 
B.	 Notations 
Po = current price of security at time to' 
t I = time information is received. 
PT = trading price of stock at time t T. 
Pi = end-of-period price of stock at time t i . 
N = number of stocks. 
F = unit of risk-free security. 
Rf = risk-free rate. 
PF = expected price by a naive fundamentalist. 
PF = current price of a naive fundamentalist. 
PI = current price of an informed trader. 
C(I)= cost of information. 
C.	 Basic Model 
The	 basic model can be represented by two simple equations: 
E(P i ) 
(1)	 Buy- and- hold trade.Po = l+Rf 
E[P1	 ,I ¢] 
(2)	 PT = Information trade.l+Rf 
The profit from trade can be written as: 
E(P i ) 
(3)	 NPV = N [ 1+R - PO] Buy-and-hold trade. 
f 
(4) NPV = N [ Information trade. 
If trading In stocks is a fair game, tomorro"'s price is expected to be the same 
as todayi s price; expected profit is zero. This scenario conforms to the 
efficient capital marKet hypothesis. 
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The model purports to show that the informed insider with super_or 
information earns profit at the expense of naive fundamentalists \{ith inferior 
informatioin. The buy-and-hold investors earn a risk-adjusted rate of return. 
The technical analysts follow a coin-flipping random strategy and earn a rate of 
return better than the naive fundamentalists. Within the context of the basic 
model, we will state and prove a number of hypotheses. 
D. Hypotheses 
(1) The value of information is zero if all traders have equal access to 
information or uninformed traders employ a buy-and-hold strategy. 
Proof 
We will prove this hypothesis under three assumptions regarding the cost of 
information. 
1a. Information is cost less and each trader has equal access to 
information. 
The end-of-period wealth of a trader can be written as 
(5) if it is an information trade. 
(6) if it is a buy-and-hold trade. 
Informed insiders have conclusive information about the end-oi-period price P1" 
If all traders are informed, the profit from information trade is zero because 
P1 P1 P1 
(7) NPV = - PT + l+R = - l+R + l+R = 0 f f f 
Therefore, there is no gain from information trades and there is no incentive to 
collect information. If some traders are informed and some ~re uninformed: 
however, the informed traders cease to trade with each other and the uninformed 
traders simply follow a buy-and-hold strategy. This is paradoxical; no trade 
\{ill occur because it does not pay to be informed. 
lb. Information is costly, and each trader has equal access to 
information. 
The profit from a trade is 
E[P1 ¢] 
(8) NPV = - PT - C(I) 
Because information collection is a negative NPV undertaking, no trader collects 
information. If information is collected, however, profit can be earned. This 
result is also puzzling. The uninformed trader simply follows a buy-and-hold 
strategy as no profit can be earned by an information trade. 
1c. Information costs are different for various groups of traders, and 
each trader has equal access to information. 
If the cost of information is greater for uninformed traders, the 
uninformed traders simply buy-and-hold -- no trade occurs. Given rational 
expectations, the uninformed traders know ex-ante that they will lose in trade 
with informed insiders. Hence, they will cease to trade. As a result, 
obtaining costly information is a losing strategy for the informed insiders. 
Therefore, no trader gets information. 
These three results based upon costless, identically costly, and 
differentially costly i~formation are not in equilibrium. These paradoxes 
resemble the well-known Grossman-Stiglitz paradox about security prices in an 
efficient capital market. 
(2) A random technical strategy dominates a naive fundamentalist strategy. 
A random strategy is similar to flipping a fair COIn. The technician makes 
a buy trade if a head appears and makes a sell trade if a.tail appears. Hence, 
he loses half of the time and wins half of the time. Over a sequence of trade, 
he earns zero excess returns whether he trades I~ith an insider or a naive 
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fundamentalist. A naive fundamentalist does not know P and acts on the basis of 
his poor information believing that it is good information whereas, in fact, it 
is poor information. The insider knows the true end-of-period price Pl. 
A naive trader buys if 
PF 
(9) PF < l+Rf 
and sells if 
PF (10) PF > l+Rf 
And insider buys if 
P1 (11) PI < l+Rf 
and sells if 
P1 (12) PI > l+Rf 
PF is a noisy signal. of actual price P1, i.e., PF = (P1 + E) because a naive 
trader buys if PF > PI and sells if PF < PI· Because PI is the discounted price 
of the actual end-of-period price P1, a naive trader loses money on either buy 
or sell trade consistently. Consequently, he earns a rate of return less than 
risk-free rate in a sequence of trade as he buys and sells at the wrong time. 
Therefore, a technical analyst earns a superior return to a naive 
fundamentalist. 
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